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Eurasia Advantage, not Genetic Diversity: Against 
Ashraf and Galor’s “Genetic Diversity” Hypothesis 
Shiping Tang ∗ 
Abstract: »Nicht genetische Vielfalt, sondern Vorteil Eurasiens. Gegen Ashraf 
und Galors „Genetic Diversity“-Hypothese«. Ashraf and Galor (2012) advanced 
the bold thesis that genetic diversity within different human populations has 
been a foundational determinant of long-run economic development. We show 
that their results are not robust after controlling for a key missing variable – 
the Eurasia dummy. After controlling for the Eurasia dummy, all indicators of 
genetic diversity lose statistical significance in regressions with indicators of 
economic development as dependent variables. Ashraf and Galor’s statistical 
results merely “reflect” – literally – Eurasia’s unique advantage in supporting 
economic development that was mostly based on settled agriculture until 
about AD1500. 
Keywords: Eurasia Advantage, Jared Diamond, genetic diversity, economic de-
velopment. 
1.  Introduction: Is Economic Development within our 
Genetic Diversity?1 
Ashraf and Galor (2012) advanced the bold thesis that genetic diversity within 
different human populations has been a more foundational determinant of eco-
nomic development in the long run than geography, from the dawn of our spe-
cies to today (Ashraf and Galor 2012, 1, 8-9).2 If the theory and the evidences 
                                                             
∗  Shiping Tang, School of International Relations and Public Affairs (SIRPA), Fudan Univeristy, 
220 Han-dan Road, Shanghai, 200433, China; twukong@fudan.edu.cn. 
1  This article is dedicated to Jared Diamond and his Guns, Germs, and Steel. 
For critical discussions and comments, the author thanks Shuo Chen, Jared Diamond, Min 
Tang, Dwayne Woods, Yu Zheng, the two reviewers of this journal, and an economist who 
wishes to remain anonymous. Andi Wang provided excellent research assistance. This re-
search is supported by a “985 project” 3rd phase bulk grant from Fudan University to the 
author. 
2  For the sake of completeness and convenience, we rely on their working paper version, 
denoted as Ashraf and Galor (2012). The published version of their paper is cited as Ashraf 
and Galor (2013a). Although Ashraf and Galor (2012, 2013a) used the term “the Out of Afri-
ca Thesis” in their titles, their core explanatory variable is really “genetic diversity.” I thus 
use “Genetic Diversity Hypothesis” in my critique of them to avoid the impression that I am 
against the original “Out of Africa Hypothesis” in the field of human evolution. In fact, I 
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presented by Ashraf and Galor (2012) hold, Ashraf and Galor (2012) surely 
represent a major advancement in our understanding of the deep causes of 
economic development in the long run, and Ashraf and Galor certainly did not 
understate the potential significance of their finding a bit (ibid., 8-9). 
Nowadays, anything that claims to link any aspect of human genetics with 
human social behavior and/or macro social outcomes is bound to garner atten-
tion from the scientific community and the general public. Unsurprisingly, even 
before Ashraf and Galor’s (2012) working paper was to be published as the 
lead article in American Economic Review (Ashraf and Galor 2013a), their 
provocative findings were picked by both a Science newspiece (Chin 2012) and 
a Nature commentary (Calloway 2012). Eventually, a mini-firestorm in the 
internet space resulted, partly ignited by a strongly worded critique from a 
group of anthropologists (Guedes et al. 2013; for other scientists’ reactions, see 
Calloway 2012).3 
So far, however, much of the criticism directed against Ashraf and Galor 
(2012), especially the critique by Guedes, et al. (2013), has been more political 
and ethical than scientific (Gelman 2013, 46). More prominently, without re-
analyzing Ashraf and Galor’s (2012) data and results, Guedes et al. (2013, 77) 
asserted: 
Ashraf and Galor’s (2013) paper is based on a fundamental scientific misunder-
standing, bad data, poor methodology, and an uncritical theoretical framework 
[…] this study has the potential to cause serious harm (emphasis added).4 
As such, Ashraf and Galor can easily dismiss their critics as largely political 
and unscientific and then claim “the scientific and even moral high ground” for 
themselves, as Gelman (2013, 46) drily noted. Indeed, in their reply to Guedes 
et al. (2013), Ashraf and Galor (2013b, 1) retorted exactly as such: 
these criticisms [i.e., Guedes et al. 2013] are scientifically baseless and ulti-
mately reflective of a misunderstanding of our empirical methodology, poten-
tial unfamiliarity with the statistical techniques that we employ, and a misin-
                                                                                                                                
strongly support the original “Out of Africa Hypothesis” in the field of human evolution, just 
as Diamond (1997) does. 
3  See the exchanges on a website maintained by Jason Collins <www.jasoncollins.org> and 
another website maintained by Matter Zimmerman <www.biasedtransmission.blogspot. 
com> (Accessed September 16, 2013). 
4  See also a blog by another anthropologist, Rebecca Dean, “Look what the economists do 
with human diversity data” <www.rebeccamdean.blogspot> (Accessed September 16, 2013). 
The only place where Guedes et al. (2013) came close to do so has been their pointing out 
that a few historical data points of population density, mostly from the Americas, might 
have been mis-measured by Ashraf and Galor (2012), following McEvedy and Jones (1978). 
Yet, Guedes et al. (2013) did not test whether better measurements of these data points will 
significantly change Ashraf and Galor’s (2012) results at all. As shown in section four below, 
leaving the Americas out (i.e., the sample with only the Old World) does not significantly 
change the statistical results. 
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terpretation of our findings (emphasis added; the same retort is essentially re-
peated on page 4 of their response). 
In this contribution, we provide a systematic econometric rebuttal against Ashraf 
and Galor, based on Ashraf and Galor’s (2012) own data. We do not question the 
possible link between migratory distance and predicted genetic diversity: We 
give Ashraf and Galor the benefit of doubt that migratory distance is a good 
proxy for predicted genetic diversity. Neither do we challenge the link between 
genetic diversity and innovation or the link between genetic diversity and cooper-
ation/conflict, although we do wish to note that the case presented by Ashraf and 
Galor (2012) on these two possible causal links has been weak at best. The evi-
dences presented by Ashraf and Galor (2012) are not from studies of human 
groups or even primates; rather, they are from flies, spiders, and honeybees.5 
Finally, we do not even challenge the data collected by Ashraf and Galor: We 
assume that all of their data are valid and accurate.6 Instead, we attempt to un-
ambiguously show that even with their own data, Ashraf and Galor’s (2012) 
results cannot hold after controlling for a key variable that is missing in their 
inquiry. Put it differently, Ashraf and Galor’s (2012) results are an artifact of 
leaving out a key variable that should have been controlled. As such, Ashraf 
and Galor’s conclusions are on shaky ground, if not entirely unwarranted. 
A key caveat is in order here. In some of the regressions reported below, the 
number of countries (as observations) is different from what Ashraf and Galor 
(2012) originally reported. This is not due to our using a different set of coun-
tries. Indeed, the original Ashraf and Galor (2012) dataset contains 208 coun-
tries, and the reason why regressions reported in Ashraf and Galor (2012) have 
fewer countries than the regressions reported below is because many of the 
independent variables they deploy have many missing values. In contrast, be-
cause we restrict our independent variables to several exogenous geographical 
variables and these variables have fewer missing data points, the number of 
countries in most of our regressions is larger than the number of countries 
reported by Ashraf and Galor (2012). The fact that our regressions have more 
countries than regressions reported by Ashraf and Galor (2012), however, does 
not invalidate our challenges against Ashraf and Galor (2012). This is so be-
cause when the Eurasia dummy is not controlled, we obtain almost identical 
results as Ashraf and Galor (2012) did: Various indicators of genetic diversity 
                                                             
5  Jason Collins has provided well-informed comments on these and other related issues in his 
blogspace: <www.jasoncollins.org>. See also the comments by Matt Zimmerman on Ashraf 
and Galor (2012) at <www.biasedtransmission.blogspot.com> (Accessed September 16, 
2013). 
6  We, of course, readily admit that some of the data employed by Ashraf and Galor (2012), 
especially population density (PD) and rate of urbanization in pre-modern times, are sub-
jected to serious problems of missing data and measurement error. For earlier discussions of 
the problems with data collected by McEvedy and Jones (1978) and Chandler (1987), see 
LeGates and Stout (1996, 21). See also Bandyopadhyay and Green (2012). 
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are statistically significant predictors of economic development and there 
seems to be a robust humped-shaped relation between genetic diversity and 
economic development. Yet, once the Eurasia dummy is controlled, various 
indicators of genetic diversity lose their statistical significance in almost all the 
regressions and the supposedly robust humped-shaped relation vanishes. 
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. Section two provides a brief 
recount of Ashraf and Galor’s (2012) key arguments, data, methods, and re-
sults. Section three presents our data and procedures for challenging Ashraf and 
Galor’s statistical results. Section four provides our results, showing that after 
controlling a key variable – the Eurasia dummy that is straight from Jared 
Diamond’s “Eurasia Advantage Thesis” (Diamond 1997) – the supposedly 
significant and robust effect on economic development of genetic diversity, 
however measured, disappears almost completely. We further show that our 
results are robust across different samples, using different indicators of eco-
nomic development as dependent variables, and using different indicators of 
genetic diversity as independent variables. Building upon existing empirical 
testing of the Diamond Thesis (e.g. Olsson and Hibbs 2005; Putterman 2008; 
Petersen and Skaaning 2010), section five establishes the validity of Diamond’s 
“Eurasia Advantage Thesis” more systematically. Section six provides a highly 
plausible explanation for Ashraf and Galor’s (2012) misleading results and 
conclusions. A brief conclusion follows. 
2.  Ashraf and Galor (2012): Key Arguments, Data, 
Methods, and Results 
Ashraf and Galor (2012, 1-2) nicely summarized the central thesis and key 
prediction of their paper, quoted in full below, with their key empirical predic-
tions emphasized in italics. 
The hypothesis rests upon two fundamental building blocks. First, migratory 
distance from the cradle of humankind in East Africa had an adverse effect on 
the degree of genetic diversity within ancient indigenous settlements across 
the globe. Following the prevailing hypothesis, commonly known as the serial 
founder effect, it is postulated that, in the course of human expansion over 
planet Earth, as subgroups of the populations of parental colonies left to estab-
lish new settlements further away, they carried with them only a subset of the 
overall genetic diversity of their parental colonies. 
Second, there exists an optimal level of diversity for economic development, 
reflecting the interplay between the opposing effects of diversity on the devel-
opment process. The adverse effect pertains to the detrimental impact of di-
versity on the efficiency of the aggregate production process. Heterogeneity 
raises the likelihood of disarray and mistrust, reducing cooperation and dis-
rupting the socioeconomic order. Higher diversity is therefore associated with 
lower productivity, which inhibits the capacity of the economy to operate effi-
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ciently relative to its production possibility frontier. The beneficial effect of 
diversity, on the other hand, concerns the positive role of heterogeneity in the 
expansion of society’s production possibility frontier. A wider spectrum of 
traits is more likely to contain those that are complementary to the advance-
ment and successful implementation of superior technological paradigms.  
Higher diversity therefore enhances society’s capability to integrate advanced 
and more efficient production methods, expanding the economy’s production 
possibility frontier and conferring the benefits of improved productivity. 
Higher diversity in a society’s population can therefore have conflicting ef-
fects on the level of its productivity. Aggregate productivity is enhanced on 
the one hand by an increased capacity for technological advancement while 
diminished on the other by reduced cooperation and efficiency. However, if 
the beneficial effects of population diversity dominate at lower levels of diver-
sity and the detrimental effects prevail at higher ones (i.e., if there are dimin-
ishing marginal returns to both diversity and homogeneity), the theory would 
predict a hump-shaped effect of genetic diversity on productivity throughout 
the development process. 
To substantiate their thesis, Ashraf and Galor (2012) first established that mi-
gratory distance from (Addis Ababa) Ethiopia does have an inverse relationship 
with observed genetic diversity, using a small dataset from 53 ethnic groups 
across globe constructed by Ramachandran et al. (2005, as Figure 1 in Ashraf 
and Galor 2012, 2). Ashraf and Galor then went on to establish that even within 
this limited sample, observed genetic diversity has a robust and statistically 
significant hump-shaped relationship with population density of their respec-
tive countries at AD1500 (Ashraf and Galor 2012, 18-24, esp., Tables 1 and 2, 
and Figure 3). 
After this reassuring start, Ashraf and Galor then went on to build a dataset 
on migratory distance of human populations from (Addis Ababa) Ethiopia to 
their present capital city and used this measure to predict “genetic diversity” of 
different populations in today’s world (for the logic and methods for construct-
ing “predicted genetic diversity,” see Ashraf and Galor 2012, 14-5).7 Eventual-
ly, they constructed two measures of “predicted genetic diversity”: non-
ancestry adjusted; ancestry-adjusted (by incorporating information on post-
1500AD population flows, see Ashraf and Galor 2012, Appendix B, xiv-xvi 
                                                             
7  Ashraf and Galor’s (2012, 14-5) did not provide much rationale or information on how they 
extrapolate from migratory distance to predicted genetic diversity. With a bit of statistical 
guesswork, however, we can reveal how Ashraf and Galor (2012) extrapolated from migra-
tory distance to “predicted genetic diversity (pdiv).” For details, see Appendix A in: Shiping 
Tang, 2016, Online Appendix to: Eurasia Advantage, not Genetic Diversity: Against Ashraf 
and Galor’s “Genetic Diversity” Hypothesis, HSR Trans 28. doi: 10.12759/hsr.trans. 
28.v01.2016. This volume of HSR Trans contains Appendices A-J. 
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and Appendix F, xl for details).8 These two indicators of predicted genetic 
diversity are then employed as key explanatory variables. 
Ashraf and Galor’s (2012) key indicators of economic development include 
population density (hereafter, PD) at AD1, AD1000, AD1500 (McEvedy and 
Jones 1978), rate of urbanization at AD1500 (Chandler 1987; Modelski 2003; see 
also Bairoch 1988), and GDP per capita in 2000 (hereafter, GDPpc2000). These 
indicators of economic development are then deployed as key dependent varia-
bles. With numerous tables and figures, Ashraf and Galor (2012) believed that 
they had shown that genetic diversity has a highly significant and hump-shaped 
relationship with economic development.9  
3.  Missing the Eurasia Continent: Logic, Data, and 
Procedure 
In Guns, Germs, and Steel, Jared Diamond (1997) provided a sweeping account 
for the fate of human societies in the world up to AD1500 and how the pre-
1500AD world has continued to shape the post-1500AD world.  
Briefly, Diamond’s (1997) “Eurasia Advantage Thesis” argues that the Eur-
asian continent as a whole holds some decisive advantages over all other conti-
nents when it comes to providing the physical environment for economic devel-
opment, at least until 1500AD. The Eurasia advantage has two core components. 
First, the Eurasia continent as a whole had been the home of most domesticated 
mammalian herbivores and omnivores (e.g., cow, goat, pig, and sheep) and staple 
crops (e.g., barley, millet, rice, and wheat). The Eurasia continent thus had “good 
material to work with” for developing settled agriculture (Olsson and Hibbs 
2005, 913-8; see also Diamond 1997; Smith 1998; Petersen and Skaaning 2010, 
205-7). Second, diffusion of domesticated animals and staple crops, together with 
other key agricultural technologies, has been easier on the Eurasia continent as 
a whole than other continents (e.g., Africa and the Americas) because  
the spread of food production tended to occur more rapidly along east-west 
axes [e.g., within Eurasia] than along north-south axes [e.g., from Eurasia to 
Africa], mainly because locations at the same latitudes required less evolu-
tionary change or adaptation of domesticates than did locations at different lat-
itudes (Diamond 2002, 705; 1997; Petersen and Skaaning 2010, 207-10).10 
                                                             
8  Not surprisingly, these two measures are highly correlated (Pearson r=0.750, significant at 
0.001 level). 
9  Although Ashraf and Galor (2012) mostly used population density at AD1500 and 
GDPpc2000 as dependent variables in their main text, they have also explored the relation-
ships between genetic diversity and other indicators of economic development as depend-
ent variables in their Appendix A (esp. Table A1, A2, A4, and A5). 
10  We examine the second component of Diamond’s Thesis in more detail in section 5 below. 
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Because the Eurasia continent as a whole holds these two key advantages, it 
has been a more fertile ground for generating the First Economic Revolution or 
the Neolithic Revolution: the coming of settled agriculture. Because settled 
agriculture provided more stable sources of protein and staple corps, it provid-
ed the key foundation for further economic development. This in turn resulted 
in a higher degree of urbanization and higher population density within a par-
ticular geographical area (Olsson and Hibbs 2005). A higher degree of urbani-
zation and population density in turn supported larger sociopolitical organiza-
tions of people, eventually culminating in archaic states (Bockstette, Chanda 
and Putterman 2002; Putterman 2008; Borcan, Olsson, and Putterman 2014).11 
Together, these earlier advantages in food production, weaponry technology, 
organizational skills in war-fighting, and immunity against certain infectious 
diseases would later allow people from the Eurasia continent to colonize other 
continents, including Africa, the Americas, and Oceania (Diamond 1997; Tang 
2013, ch. 2).  
In short, the “Eurasia Advantage thesis” argues that the Eurasian continent 
as a whole held some decisive advantages over all other continents when it 
comes to providing the physical environment for economic development, at 
least until 1500AD. After 1500AD, the Europeans began to colonize the world 
and brought what they had (good or bad) to the rest of the world. Along the 
way, the Europeans had thus vastly complicated the picture. 
Because Ashraf and Galor (2012, 1, 8-9, Appendix A4, xi-xiii) explicitly set 
out to challenge the Diamond Thesis, Ashraf and Galor should have included 
Eurasia as a whole as a control dummy variable.12 Yet, they have failed to do. 
When this is the case, Ashraf and Galor’s (2012) results might have been the 
product of a failure to control for a key competing variable. We set out to test 
this possibility. 
We proceed as follows: 
1) We first test the Eurasia dummy (1 if a country is classified as a European or 
an Asian countries in Ashraf and Galor’s own data; 0 otherwise) as a possi-
ble independent explanatory factor for economic development against the 
four key indicators of economic development (i.e., PD at AD1, AD1000, 
AD1500, and GDPpc2000) as dependent variables, in three different sam-
ples: the whole world, the whole world excluding Australia, Canada, New 
                                                             
11  Here, we are not concerned with whether earlier transition to settled agriculture and hence 
statehood has a negative impact on subsequent political and economic development such as 
adoption of democracy and industrialization after 1500AD. For important works on this 
front, see Hariri (2012); Borcan, Olsson and Putterman (2014); Chanda, Cook and Putterman 
(2014). For a brief discussion, see the conclusion in Section 7. 
12  We have also tested by inserting the Europe dummy and the Asia dummy separately into 
the regressions, and we obtain essentially identical results. These results are reported in sec-
tion 4 below and in Appendix G. 
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Zealand, and the United States (hereafter, ACNU), and the Old World (i.e., 
Africa, Asia, plus Europe).13 
2) We then test Ashraf and Galor’s key explanatory variables (genetic diversity 
or migratory distance, whether ancestry adjusted or not) separately and es-
tablish their plausibility as key explanatory factors for long-run economic 
development. We test indicators of genetic diversity that are not ancestry-
adjusted against all four key indicators of economic development, again in 
three different samples. Consistent with Ashraf and Galor’s logic, we only 
test ancestry adjusted measurements of predicted genetic diversity or migra-
tory distance against PD1500 and GDPpc2000.14 Not surprisingly, in these 
regressions, we obtain results that are almost identical to the results reported 
in Ashraf and Galor (2012). 
3) We then pit the Eurasia dummy against different indicators of genetic diver-
sity in horse-race models, again within three different samples. 
4) We then add more control variables. To avoid any possibility of endogenei-
ty, we deploy only three fixed geographical variables: landlocked (1 if a 
country or territory is landlocked country, 0 if not), absolute latitude of a 
country (taking natural log), and island (1 if a country or territory is an is-
land, 0 if not). We exclude other bio-climate variables such as area of arable 
land, rain fall, and soil PH etc., because they are subjected to modification 
by human activities and natural causes (Pimentel et al. 1995; Montgomery 
2007).15 We also exclude other proxy indicators of economic development 
such as the timing of the Neolithic Revolution and ancient statehood as con-
trol variables not only because archaeological dating the exact time of these 
events has never been easy and conclusive, but also because these indicators 
are intervening variables between Eurasia (and other exogenous geograph-
ical variables) and economic development. 
5) We then add distance to (regional) technological frontiers at AD1, AD1000, 
and AD1500 to the models in order to capture the effect of diffusion as sin-
                                                             
13  The Eurasia dummy is easily generated by adding Ashraf and Galor’s Europe dummy and 
Asia dummy together. Following Ashraf and Galor (2012), we also perform regressions with 
bootstrap procedures. Regression results with or without bootstrap procedures are almost 
identical. We thus report only results from regressions without bootstrap procedures here. 
14  For the sake of completeness, we also regress ancestry-adjusted indicators of genetic diver-
sity against PD1 and PD1000. These results are reported in the appendices of HSR Trans 28. 
15  For instance, it is well known that the Fertile Crescent had become much less fertile in 
history partly due to human activities, especially agriculture supported by vast irrigation 
(Diamond 2011). Likewise, the pattern of rainfall has also changed significantly for northern 
China. Whereas the South China Sea monsoon could still reach much of northern China 
around 3000BC, today it can only reach the Yangtze valley (Liu 2004, ch. 2). Consequently, 
northern China has become much drier and less fertile. Moreover, data on rainfall, arable 
land etc. are all from contemporary time (i.e., post-1960), and surely we cannot use these 
data to explain outcomes before AD1500! 
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gled out by Diamond (1997). Data for these three variables are from Ashraf 
and Galor (2012). 
6) We then test the effect upon economic development of genetic diversity vs. 
the three fixed geographical variables, within Eurasian countries alone. This 
is a litmus test whether genetic diversity has any impact upon economic de-
velopment at all because the effect of Eurasia will be eliminated within this 
sub-sample of only Eurasian countries. 
7) We then perform more robustness tests by inserting Europe and Asia into 
the models as two separate dummies, but always together. Again, various 
measures of genetic diversity have no robust relationship with economic de-
velopment in these tests. 
8) We then test Eurasia against genetic diversity in the limited samples of 21 
countries with “observed” or “actual” genetic diversity to drive home our 
points. If “observed” genetic diversity has no robust significant relationship 
with economic development after controlling for the Eurasia dummy, then 
the whole enterprise of Ashraf and Galor’s (2012, esp. 18-24) has no foun-
dation to start with and hence the whole enterprise collapses. 
9) Because Ashraf and Galor (2012, Table D4, xxv) reported that letting differ-
ent measurements of genetic diversity take natural log does not change their 
overall results, we also perform such tests by using the natural log of differ-
ent measurements of genetic diversity as independent variables in various 
samples. Again, we obtain almost identical results that strongly contradict 
Ashraf and Galor’s claims. We report these results in the appendices of HSR 
Trans 28. 
All estimations are based on a basic model below, following Ashraf and Galor 
(2012, 16-7):  
ln(yi) = α + βGeneticdiversityi + γGeneticdiversityi2 + λZi + εi 
Where iy  is a measurement of economic development for country i  (e.g., PD 
at AD1, AD1000, AD1500, or GDPpc2000), Geneticdiversity is the predicted 
genetic diversity of country i , iZ  is a vector for control variables (e.g., the 
Eurasia dummy, distance to frontier at AD1, landlocked) for country i , and iε
is an error term assumed to be normally distributed. Estimation procedures are 
standard OLS regressions as done by Ashraf and Galor (2012). 
A caveat is in order. We drop rate of urbanization at 1500 (ur1500 in Ashraf 
and Galor 2012) as a dependent variable because it has far too many missing 
data points. We also drop other less direct indicators of economic development 
(e.g., the number of scientific articles published by a country divided by its 
population) or possible intervening variable between genetic diversity and 
economic development (e.g., trust) as dependent variables. After all, if genetic 
diversity is shown to have no robust and significant relationship with the four 
key indicators of economic development (i.e., PD at AD1, AD1000, AD1500, 
and GDPpc2000), the enterprise of Ashraf and Galor’s (2012) would have 
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collapsed completely, and there is little need for us to further test whether ge-
netic diversity has any impact upon trust and numbers of scientific papers pub-
lished when it comes to assessing the impact on economic development of 
genetic diversity.  
We shall hold the following two straightforward predictions: 
1) If Ashraf and Galor (2012) are correct, the hump-shaped relationship be-
tween indicators of (predicted) genetic diversity and various indicators of 
economic development should hold in most of the models with different sam-
ples, even after controlling for the Eurasia dummy, the three other exogenous 
geographical variables, and distance to regional technological frontiers. 
2) If, however, the Eurasia Advantage Thesis is correct, then the Eurasia dum-
my should have a robust and significant positive relationship with various 
indicators of economic development whereas distance to regional technolog-
ical frontiers should have a robust and significant negative relationship with 
various indicators of economic development, across most of the models with 
different samples. Moreover, the Eurasia dummy should replace various in-
dicators of genetic diversity as the most potent explanatory factors for eco-
nomic development in most horse-race models that pit the Eurasia dummy 
against various indicators of genetic diversity, in different samples. 
4.  Missing the Big Eurasia Continent: Empirical Results 
4.1  Initial Test: Establishing the Plausibility of the Diamond Thesis 
Our initial test firmly establishes the Eurasia dummy as a plausible key explan-
atory factor for economic development, lending strong support for the first key 
component of “the Diamond Thesis” (see also Olsson and Hibbs 2005; Putter-
man 2008; Petersen and Skaaning 2010). As shown in Table 1, the Eurasia 
dummy is highly significant in all the models when tested independently 
against all four key indicators of economic development as dependent variable 
in the three different samples at a level of p<0.001 (t statistics from 4.823 to 
8.543). Indeed, the Eurasia dummy alone can explain 11.4%-32% of the varia-
tions with the four indicators of economic development. 
We then test the unconditional effect on economic development of two 
measures of genetic diversity. As shown in Table 2A and Table 2B, when 
tested independently, indicators of genetic diversity, whether ancestry-adjusted 
or not, are significant in most of the models in all three different samples (see 
also Table A3-a, and A4-a). Moreover, the signs in front of the first order term 
and the second order term, when they are significant, are consistent with Ashraf 
and Galor’s thesis: the first order term has a positive sign whereas the second 
order term has a negative sign. Furthermore, consistent with the results report-
ed in Tables 5, 6, 7, D9, and D11 in Ashraf and Galor (2012), predicted genetic 
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diversity-ancestry adjusted is significant when GDPpc2000 is the dependent 
variable but insignificant when the dependent variable is indicator of economic 
development before AD1500. These initial results are broadly consistent with 
Ashraf and Galor’s thesis that genetic diversity has a hump-shaped relationship 
with economic development (e.g., Ashraf and Galor 2012, Figures 3, 4, and 5). 
One should note, however, that Ashraf and Galor’s results do not always 
hold in these initial tests. For instance, in Model 10 and Model 11 of Table 2A, 
neither the first order term nor the second order term of predicted genetic di-
versity is significant when PD1000 and PD1500 are the dependent variables 
and the sample is the Old World. Moreover, in Model 6 of Table 2B, both the 
first order term and the second order tem of predicted genetic diversity-
ancestry adjusted are significant when PD1000 is the dependent variable and 
the sample is the whole world excluding ACNU. Likewise, in Model 9 of Table 
2B, both the first order term and the second order tem of predicted genetic 
diversity-ancestry adjusted are significant when PD1 is the dependent variable 
and the sample is the Old World. Yet according to Ashraf and Galor (2012), 
indicators of predicted genetic diversity-ancestry adjusted should be largely 
irrelevant for understanding outcomes before AD1500. These initial results, 
however, provide at least some support for Ashraf and Galor’s (2012) claim 
that genetic diversity is a significant determining factor of economic develop-
ment, if not one hundred percent. 
4.2  Horse-Race Models: The Eurasia Advantage Demolishes 
“Genetic Diversity” 
Once we pit the Eurasia dummy against different measures of genetic diversity, 
however, things fall apart almost completely for Ashraf and Galor’s thesis that 
genetic diversity has a robust and significant hump-shaped relationship with 
economic development. Strikingly, once we put both predicted genetic diversi-
ty and the Eurasia dummy together into regressions, whereas the Eurasia dum-
my remains highly significant throughout, predicted genetic diversity – whether 
its first order term or its second order term – becomes thoroughly insignificant 
(Table 3A). Moreover, these results are robust when we add more exogenous 
control variables, including the three fixed geographical variables and distance 
to regional technological frontiers at different historical time (Table 3B). Also, 
inserting the two terms of predicted genetic diversity into the models does not 
improve the overall fit of the models with only the Eurasia dummy (compare 
Models 1-4 of Table 3A with Models 9-12 of Table 3A). In contrast, inserting 
the three fixed geographical variables and the distance to regional technological 
frontiers at different historical time into the models does improve the overall fit 
of the models significantly (compare Table 3A and Table 3B). 
We obtain almost identical results when employing predicted genetic diver-
sity-ancestry adjusted as the indicator of genetic diversity (Table 4A and Table 
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4B). As a matter of fact, with the presence of the Eurasia dummy, “predicted 
genetic diversity-ancestry adjusted” either becomes insignificant or the signs in 
front of the first order term and the second order term of “predicted genetic 
diversity-ancestry adjusted” are exactly the opposite to what Ashraf and Galor 
(2012) predicted (see esp. Models 7-8 in Table 4A and Models 3-4 and Models 
7-8 in Table 4B). 
Indeed, we obtain almost identical results when employing all possible 
measures of genetic diversity, from migratory distance-ancestry adjusted, to 
predicted genetic diversity and predicted genetic diversity-ancestry adjusted, 
regardless of whether we take natural log of these indicators or not (see the 
Appendixes).16 Certainly, these results do not support Ashraf and Galor’s claim 
that genetic diversity has a robust and significant hump-shaped relationship 
with economic development. 
Results with different samples (i.e., the world excluding ACNU, the Old 
World) are almost identical (these results are reported in Appendix C and Ap-
pendix D). Using alternative dependent variables (e.g., PD without taking the 
natural log) or alternative indicators of genetic diversity (e.g., migratory dis-
tance taken natural log) does not change the results in any significant sense 
(these results are reported in Appendix F). Across the board, (predicted) genet-
ic diversity, whether ancestry-adjusted or not, has no robust relationship with 
indicators of economic development, after controlling Eurasia as a dummy 
variable alone. Simply put, Ashraf and Galor’s (2012) supposedly robust 
hump-shaped relationship between genetic diversity and (indicators of) eco-
nomic development is nowhere to be found. 
Because GDPpc2000 is subject to less measurement error than population 
density in historical time, let us dwell on the supposedly “highly significant and 
stable hump-shaped effect of genetic diversity on income per capita in the year 
2000 CE” claimed by Ashraf and Galor (2012, 7) a bit more. In order for the 
hump-shaped relationship between genetic diversity and GPDpc2000 to hold, 
the first order term of genetic diversity (however measured, and whether ances-
try adjusted or not) must have a positive sign and the second order term of 
genetic diversity (whether ancestry adjusted or not) a negative sign, and both 
terms must be statistically significant. 
Unfortunately, this is not the kind of result we have obtained with Ashraf 
and Galor’s (2012) own data. In most of the models with GDPpc2000 being the 
dependent variable, after controlling for the Eurasia dummy and other fixed 
                                                             
16  This should not come as a surprise. Because migratory distance and predicted genetic diver-
sity are 100% correlated (Appendix A), the results obtained from these two independent 
variables are almost 100% identical (see appendix A, also compare Tables 3A, 3B with Tables 
B3-a, B3-b, B3-c in Appendix B). Likewise, because migratory distance-ancestry adjusted 
and predicted genetic diversity-ancestry adjusted too are 100% correlated (again, see Ap-
pendix A), the results obtained from these two independent variables are almost 100% 
identical (see appendix B, compare Table B2 and Table B4 in Appendix B). 
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geographical factors, both terms of genetic diversity, whether ancestry-adjusted 
or not, become insignificant (Tables 3A, 3B, 4A and 4B; see also results re-
ported in the appendixes). For example, in Table 4A, although both terms of 
genetic diversity-ancestry adjusted are significant after controlling for the Eur-
asia dummy (Model 8, see also Model 4), this result is not robust once we add 
exogenous geographical variables and distance to technological frontiers to the 
models (Model 4 and Model 8 of Table 4B).  
Thus, contrary to Ashraf and Galor’s claim that “the highly significant and 
stable hump-shaped effect of genetic diversity on income per capita in the year 
2000 CE is not an artifact of postcolonial migrations towards prosperous coun-
tries and the concomitant increase in ethnic diversity in these economies” (Ash-
raf and Galor 2012, 7; see also Ashraf and Galor 2012, 22-30, Tables 3-8, and 
Figures 4 and 5), there is no robust relationship between various measurements 
of genetic diversity and income per capita in the year 2000 CE. 
Overall, our results are anything but comforting to Ashraf and Galor (2012): 
The various indicators of genetic diversity perform utterly dismally in most of 
the models with different samples. One certainly would not want to claim these 
results point to a robust and highly significant hump-shaped relationship be-
tween genetic diversity and economic development. 
4.3  Testing Europe and Asia as Separate Dummies 
Even if we test Europe and Asia as two separate dummies (rather than as the 
Eurasia dummy together) but with both dummies being inserted into the mod-
els, we obtain essentially identical results. In most of the models, both Europe 
and Asia have a robust and statistically significant positive relationship with 
various indicators of economic development, whereas indicators of genetic di-
versity do not (Table 5A, 5B, and 6; additional results are reported in Appendix 
H).17 Indeed, some of the results point to the fact that Asia had fallen significantly 
behind Europe after 1500AD (i.e., there was “the Great Divergence” between 
Europe and Asia after 1500AD). When regressed against GDPpc2000, Asia, 
although remaining positive, becomes insignificant after controlling for other 
geographical factors (Model 4, Table 5B; Models 2 and 4, Table 6). Again, 
these results provide more reassuring confirmation of the Eurasia Advantage 
Thesis, but debilitating challenges against Ashraf and Galor’s “Genetic Diver-
sity” thesis. 
                                                             
17  The fact that distance to frontier at AD1500 becomes insignificant when regressed against 
GDPpc2000 is also reassuring. Likewise, the fact that the island dummy has a robust positive 
relationship with economic development after AD1500 in all the models is also reassuring. 
For a more detailed discussion, see also section 5 below. 
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4.4  What about the Relationship between “Observed” Genetic 
Diversity and Economic Development? 
After thoroughly undermining Ashraf and Galor’s evidences that predicted 
genetic diversity has a robust and significant relationship (whether hump-shaped 
or not) with economic development with larger samples, we now move to the 
limited sample of 21 countries with “observed” genetic diversity from the 53 
human groups. If we can show that even “observed genetic diversity” has no 
robust and significant relationship with economic development, we believe that 
we should have driven home our counterpoints against Ashraf and Galor (2012). 
And this is exactly we have obtained (Table 7). We first show that when 
testing independently against PD1, PD1000, PD1500, and GDPpc2000, the 
Eurasia dummy remains highly significant and has correct signs throughout 
(Models 1-4). We then show that when testing independently against PD1, 
PD1000, and PD1500 (but not GDPpc2000), both terms of observed genetic 
diversity are highly significant and have correct signs that are consistent with 
Ashraf and Galor’s thesis. Things seem conspicuous for Ashraf and Galor. 
Also note that Model 7 in Table 7 reproduces the exact same results of Model 1 
in Ashraf and Galor’s Table 1 (Ashraf and Galor 2012, 19), so Ashraf and 
Galor cannot dismiss these results as errors or inconsistencies produced by 
different procedures on our part. 
When the dependent variable is GDPpc2000, both the first order term and 
the second order term of observed genetic diversity become insignificant even 
when testing independently (Model 8, Table 5). Worse, after controlling for the 
Eurasia dummy, both terms of observed genetic diversity become insignificant 
even when the dependent variables are PD1, PD1000, and PD1500 (Models 5-
8, Table 7). In contrast, the Eurasia dummy remains highly significant when 
the dependent variables are PD1, PD1000, PD1500, and GDPpc2000 (although 
only at 0.05 or 0.1 level, Models 9-12), despite the presence of both terms of 
genetic diversity. 
With these results, there is really nothing left for Ashraf and Galor’s (2012) 
thesis that actual or predicted genetic diversity has a robust and significant 
relationship with economic development with larger samples, whether hump-
shaped or not. 
4.5  The Litmus Test: Testing with the Eurasia Sample 
There may be one last straw for Ashraf and Galor: They can claim that even 
though genetic diversity has not been a major determinant of economic devel-
opment across the whole world, genetic diversity may still be a major determi-
nant of economic development within Eurasia itself. If such a possibility holds, 
Ashraf and Galor can still claim that genetic diversity is a more foundational 
factor in shaping economic development than Eurasia (and other geographical 
factors). We thus also test genetic diversity within Eurasia alone to eliminate 
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the possibility that genetic diversity can significantly explain the variations in 
economic development within Eurasia even if it cannot significantly explain 
the variations in economic development beyond Eurasia.  
Our results are anything but comfort for Ashraf and Galor. As shown in Ta-
ble 8A, genetic diversity, whether ancestry-adjusted or not, has no statistically 
significant effect upon economic development even when tested independently: 
The models have almost no explanatory power for all four indicators of eco-
nomic development. Indeed, when taking the natural log, the first order term of 
predicted genetic diversity, whether ancestry adjusted or not, is consistently 
eliminated automatically during regression due to strong collinearality, indicat-
ing that the first order term and the second order term of genetic diversity have 
no different impact over indicators of economic development within Eurasia 
(Table 8B). With these results, we see no further need to test the supposedly 
robust and significant relationship between other indicators of genetic diversity 
and indicators of economic development. For the sake of completeness, how-
ever, we perform these tests anyway (results from these tests are reported in 
Appendix E). Needless to say, these results lend no support for Ashraf and 
Galor’s thesis whatsoever. 
5.  Diamond’s Eurasia Advantage Thesis Vindicated 
As noted above, Jared Diamond’s Eurasia Advantage Thesis has two key com-
ponents (Diamond 1997, 2002; see also Olsson and Hibbs 2005; Putterman 
2008; Petersen and Skaaning 2010). First, the Eurasia continent as a whole held 
unique advantages for economic development over other continents, at least up 
until AD1500. Second, the diffusion of technologies, especially agricultural 
technologies, had been a key determinant of economic development before 
AD1500 and this component holds within and without Eurasia. In sections 
three and four above, we have mostly tested the first component of Diamond’s 
Thesis against Ashraf and Galor’s thesis that genetic diversity is a more foun-
dational factor in shaping economic development and have shown that the 
Eurasia Advantage Thesis firmly holds its ground when pitted against various 
measures of genetic diversity. This section establishes the validity of the Eura-
sia Advantage Thesis more systematically.  
We improve upon existing tests of Diamond’s Thesis (e.g., Olsson and 
Hibbs 2005; Putterman 2008; Petersen and Skaaning 2010) on three fronts. 
First, we use a larger set of countries, drawing from Ashraf and Galor’s (2012) 
dataset and Petersen and Skaaning’s dataset (2010).18  
                                                             
18  Olsson and Hibbs’ (2005) dataset covers only 84 countries with six regional clusters. Pe-
tersen and Skaaning (2010) expanded the dataset to cover 171 countries with nine regional 
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Second, we employ a more reliable set of geographical factors. As noted in 
section three above, to avoid any possibility of endogeneity, we employ only 
three exogenous geographical variables: the landlocked dummy, absolute lati-
tude of a country (taken natural log), and the island dummy. We exclude other 
possible bio-climate variables such as area of arable land, rain fall, and soil PH 
etc because they have been modified in history by human activities and natural 
causes. Indeed, we show that there is no need to construct more elaborate indica-
tors of geographical and biological indicators to substantiate the Eurasia Ad-
vantage Thesis (cf. Olsson and Hibbs 2005; Putterman 2008; Petersen and Skaan-
ing 2010). We also exclude other proxy indicators of economic development 
such as the timing of the Neolithic Revolution and ancient statehood (e.g., 
Putterman 2008; Petersen and Skaaning 2010) because archaeological dating 
the exact time of these events has never been easy and conclusive. Third, we 
show that the second component of the Diamond Thesis holds in samples with-
in or without Eurasia.  
We proceed in three steps. First, we establish that both geographical compo-
nents (geocom) and biological components (biocom) assembled first by Olsson 
and Hibbs (2005), and then expanded to cover more countries by Petersen and 
Skaaning (2010), are largely determined by Eurasia and the other three fixed 
geographical factors. Second, we show that for samples that include Eurasia, 
both the Eurasia dummy and diffusion components are significant determinants 
of economic development. Third, we show that within Eurasia, diffusion is a 
significant determinant of economic development. These results are presented 
in Tables 9-11 below, and full results are reported in Appendix F. 
As shown in Tables 9 and 10, Eurasia alone accounts for 51.7-64.8% of the 
variations within the geographical component and the biological component 
across the whole world (Models 1-5, Table 9).19 After adding the other three 
fixed geographical factors to Eurasia, these factors together account for 68.8-
85.1% of the variations within the two components (Models 11-15, Table 9). 
Within Eurasia, the three fixed geographical factors account for 57-69% of the 
variations in the geographical component and 26.9-35.3% of variation in the 
biological component (Models 1 to 5, Table 10). 
As shown clearly in Table 11, and Tables F1, F2, and F3 in Appendix F, 
with samples being the whole world, the whole world excluding ACNU, and 
the Old World only, the Eurasia dummy and diffusion (measured as the dis-
tance to regional technological frontiers at various historical time) are the two 
most important factors in shaping economic development, at least before 
                                                                                                                                
clusters. Petersen and Skaaning’s data are highly correlated with Olsson and Hibbs’ original 
data, Pearson r=0.808 to 0.998, significant at 0.001 level. 
19  The Eurasia dummy is strongly correlated with geographical component and biological 
component by Olsson and Hibbs (2005) and Petersen and Skaaning (2010): Pearson r=0.721 
to 0.806, significant at 0.001 level. 
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AD1500, and they remain highly significant today. Both factors are significant 
through almost all the models at 0.01 level (with the exception of Model 16, 
Table 11 and Model 16, Table E3 in Appendix E, although in both models, 
they just miss the cutoff level of p=0.1). Moreover, both factors have the cor-
rect signs: Eurasia is positively associated with economic development, where-
as distance to regional technological frontiers is negatively associated with 
economic development. Together, these two factors account for up to 43% of 
the variations in population density at AD1, 21.4-24.4% of the variations in 
population density at AD1000, 26.7% of the variations in population density at 
AD1500, and 12.8-33.1% of the differences in GDPpc2000. These results hold 
firm when adding the three geographical factors (i.e., landlocked, latitude, and 
island): Indeed, adding the three factors often further improves the overall fit of 
the models significantly (Model 13-16, Table 11; see also Tables F1-F4). 
More reassuringly, compared to the overall fit of the models in which Eura-
sia and distance to frontiers are regressed against various dependent variables 
independently, putting these two variables together always improve the over fit 
of the models significantly. Having Eurasia and diffusion together improves the 
overall fit of the models 12.3-35.4% over models with only Eurasia, and 61.8-
161% over models with only diffusion. These results indicate that Eurasia and 
diffusion operate mostly independently. Adding the three other geographical 
factors further improves the overall fit of the models.  
Finally, the fact that the island dummy has a robust positive relationship 
with economic development after 1500AD is also reassuring. As shown in 
Table 9 and Table 10, consistent with the Eurasia Advantage Thesis, the island 
dummy is negatively associated with both geocomponent and biocompoment at 
the 0.001 level. Yet, island becomes positively associated with economic de-
velopment when GDPpc2000 is the dependent variable (Model 16, Table 11; 
see also Model 16, Table F2; Model 16, Table F3, in Appendix F), presumably 
because ocean-crossing became a key factor that promotes long distance trade 
after 1500AD. This result is consistent with what Spolaore and Wacziarg 
(2013) have found: whereas island dummy is positively associated with GDP 
per capita at 2005, it is negatively associated with years since agricultural tran-
sition at AD1500 (compare Model 1 within their Table 2, 331 with other mod-
els in which island dummy is an independent variables in their Table 1, 5, 7 on 
pages 328, 339, and 345 respectively). These results therefore strongly support 
the Eurasia Advantage Thesis.  
6.  What Might Have Misled Ashraf and Galor (2012)? 
After establishing the validity of the Diamond Thesis, we now offer a plausible 
explanation for Ashraf and Galor’s misleading results. We suspect that the hump-
shaped relationship between genetic diversity, whether actual or predicted, mere-
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ly reflects the geographical shape of the world map. If we leave out Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and the United States for a moment, 
the hump part of the curves presented in Ashraf and Galors’s (2012) Figure 4 
(27) and Figure 5 (37) contains mostly Eurasian (i.e., European and Asian) coun-
tries. In contrast, the extreme left part of the curves contains almost exclusively 
African countries, whereas the extreme right part of the curves contains almost 
exclusively (South and North) American countries. Ashraf and Galor could have 
mistakenly reasoned that these hump-shaped curves point to a robust and signifi-
cant hump-shaped relationship between genetic diversity (underpinned by migra-
tory distance) and economic development without realizing that these curves 
merely reflect – literally – the geographical shape of the world. Indeed, if we 
compare the hump-shaped plots from Ashraf and Galor and the shape of the 
world map (Figure 1), the similarities between these two figures are simply too 
striking to be ignored. 
There is also a more technical aspect to Ashraf and Galor’s error. In most 
regressions with global samples, we often control the effect upon a particular 
outcome of a country’s geographical location by controlling for “continent 
fixed effects.” And this is precisely what Ashraf and Galor (2012, 2013a) have 
done. Yet, such a practice is inappropriate when trying to differentiate the 
effect of the Eurasia continent upon economic development from the effect of 
“genetic diversity (really, migratory distance)” upon economic development.  
The logic is simple. Because it is the Eurasia continent as a whole that holds 
decisive advantages over other continents when it comes to providing the phys-
ical environment for economic development at least until 1500AD, the Eurasia 
continent must be treated as a whole, at least until 1500AD; only after 1500 
AD, did the European part and the Asian part of the Eurasia continent begin to 
diverge significantly in terms of economic development. This in turn means that 
in the regressions done here and in Ashraf and Galor (2012, 2013a), one must 
control the Eurasian continent as a whole in regressions rather than controlling 
either Europe or Asia alone as it is conventionally done (i.e., by controlling for 
“continent fixed effects”).  
Indeed, if one were to control for either Europe or Asia alone as “continent 
fixed effects” as Ashraf and Galor (2012, 2013a) have done in some of their 
regression models (esp., the models in their Tables 7 and 8), one would some-
times – but not always – obtain the hump-shaped relationship between indica-
tors of “genetic diversity”/migratory distance and indicators of economic de-
velopment (i.e., indicators of “genetic diversity”/migratory distance are 
significant and show correct signs). But such results merely reflect the fact that 
only part of the Eurasia Advantage has been controlled (results shown in Ap-
pendix J). And when the whole Eurasia Advantage has been controlled, the 
supposedly robust hump-shaped relationship between indicators of “genetic 
diversity” and indicators of economic development disappears completely, as 
the results in the many tables presented above have unambiguously shown. 
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Figure 1: The Geographical Shape of the World 
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
We hope we have firmly undermined Ashraf and Galor’s thesis that genetic 
diversity of different human populations has been a more foundational factor in 
shaping long term economic development than the geographical factors and 
diffusion effect identified by Diamond (1997). Although our exercises hold im-
portant implications for a wide range of issues and point to more productive 
venues for future research, we shall focus on what might have misled Ashraf and 
Galor in their endeavor of advancing a more foundational understanding about 
the deep causes of long-run economic development. We believe that Ashraf and 
Galor might have been misled by three conceptual and logical errors.  
First and foremost, Ashraf and Galor (2012, 2013a) failed to correctly grasp 
the two key components of Diamond’s Eurasia Advantage Thesis, and thus also 
failed to control the Eurasia dummy when testing their genetic diversity hypothe-
ses. The Eurasia Advantage Thesis explicitly argues that the Eurasia continent 
as a whole had held a unique advantage over other continents in providing the 
physical foundation for economic development in the pre-1500AD world. As 
shown above, once the Eurasia dummy is controlled, genetic diversity’s sup-
posedly robust and significant impact on economic development disappears 
almost completely. In contrast, Eurasia’s powerful impact on economic devel-
opment remains robust and significant throughout the models. In a nutshell, 
Ashraf and Galor’s (2012) results merely reflect – literally – Eurasia’s unique 
advantage in underpinning economic development that was mostly based on 
agriculture after the coming of settled agriculture until about AD1500 (see 
Figure 1 above). 
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Second, Ashraf and Galor have failed to grasp some fundamental difficulties 
in linking genetics with human social behavior and macro social outcomes. 
While linking specific gene(s) with specific biological phenotypes faces less 
uncertainty, linking specific gene(s) with specific human social behavior(s) is 
far less certain. As Benjamin et al. (2012a) show, most of the statistical asso-
ciation between genetic markers and human social behaviors reported so far 
have been false positives (see also Beauchamp et al. 2011; Benjamin et al. 
2012b; Charney and English 2012, 2013). Things become decisively more 
complicated when we move from specific genes to genetic diversity within 
human populations. We simply know very little about how genetic diversity 
impacts human social behavior, and even less about how genetic diversity 
impacts macro social outcomes such as economic development.  
Fundamentally, although our social behavior is constrained by the foundation 
shaped by our biological evolution, it is only partly so. Most of our social behav-
ior has been the product of the interaction between biological factors and social 
factors, and there is no straightforward way to link our biological evolution with 
our social behavior, not to mention macro social outcomes such as long-run 
economic development. The possible linkage between genetic diversity (and 
genetics) and long-run economic development may be “a bridge too far.”  
Finally, back to genetic diversity more concretely, it is far more likely that 
within a wide range of genetic diversity, our biological evolution has provided 
us with enough intellectual and physical capacities to go around when it comes 
to economic development. As such, all human populations, as long as they 
have a large enough population supported by favorable environment, have all 
the biological (including genetic) potentials to develop economically: genetic 
difference only matters on (very) small scales (Zimmerman 2013).20 For human 
populations that are large enough (e.g., at the scale of a country), their genetic 
makeup has not been a key determining factor of economic development. The 
deeper cause of the enormous variations in economic development across the 
globe thus does not within our genetics or genetic diversity but elsewhere. Far 
more plausibly, the chance for development had been foremost constrained by 
geography before 1500AD (Diamond 1997) and then by bad institutions and 
other social factors after 1500AD, although geography still matters a great deal 
by impacting the historical evolution of different institutions (e.g., democracy 
vs. autocracy) and other social factors such as cultural traits (Jones 1981; North 
1990; Easterly and Levine 2003; Rodrik et al. 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson 
2012; Hariri 2012; Olsson and Paik 2014; Tang 2011; Tang, Hu and Li n.d.).21 
                                                             
20  Zimmerman (2013) also noted that genetic diversity cannot explain (much) cognitive diversity.  
21  I am thus suggesting that that geography and institutions are not incompatible because 
there is a temporal dimension to the question of whether geography matters more or insti-
tutions matter more. Recall that the state is one of the most complex organizations our 
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